As the Narendra Modi-led National Democratic Alliance government settles in its second term with a plethora of foreign policy challenges looming large, it faces unusual headwinds from what should be a "natural partner"the United Stateson both economic and strategic fronts. In June 2019, the Trump administration announced the revocation of India's special trade status on the grounds that "India had not assured the US that it will provide equitable and reasonable access to its market." 1 Special trade status, also known as the Generalized System of Preferences allows duty-free imports of goods up to US$5.6 billion into the United States from India. This trade dispute has been brewing for some time. In 2018, Washington had imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum exported from India under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on the grounds of national security. A series of protective measures against India led to a tit-for-tat response from New Delhi which imposed tariffs of $235 million on US goods worth $1.4 billion, prompting speculation about growing Indo-US tensions with trade as the focal point.
Yet, despite negative headlines dominating the Indo-US diplomatic engagements in recent months, the underpinnings of the relationship remain robust. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, at the 44th annual meeting of the US-India Business Council, pointed out the idea of a US-India partnership isn't new and had been in the offing for seven decades, since India won independence: "Our two democracies and a close relationship seemed inevitable, a matter of 'when' not 'if.'" 2 He went on to highlight the advances made in Indo-US relations under the Trump administration and need for both countries to cooperate further in the Indo-Pacific region and the world at large. Former acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan echoed similar sentiments during the Shangri-La dialog in Singapore, hailing US-India defense relations and India as a major defense partner.
Pompeo's address reflects India's increasing centrality in US strategic calculations. A report on the Indo-Pacific, released in June 2019 by the Pentagon, emphasizes the value of the Indo-Pacific region to global trade and commerce: "We have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all nations, large and small are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, and principles of fair competition." 3 Notwithstanding some frictions, the Indo-US relationship has been on the upward trajectory since the end of the Cold War. Alignment of strategic interests has led to deeper cooperation in diplomatic as well as defense cooperation. The conclusion of landmark civil nuclear pact in 2008 was the high point of the bilateral ties and defense relationship and remains today the defining element of this relationship.
India's elevation to Strategic Trade Authorization-1 list in 2018 allows it to import high-end sensitive technologies like armed drones. Bestowing STA-1 status can be seen as a logical step after the United States recognized India as a "major defense partner" in 2016, enabling sale of high-end technology at par with the US allies. Last year saw the inauguration of India-US 2 + 2 ministerial dialogue, signing of Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement to facilitate real-time information sharing between both countries, altering the nomenclature of US Pacific Command to the US Indo-Pacific Command and consensus on the first tri-service exercise. These agreements demonstrate the intent of the United States and India to forge a security partnership in the Indo-Pacific to meet the challenges of these turbulent times.
On the trade front, while the American trade deficit declined from $27 billion in 2017 to $21 billion in 2018, differences persist with President Donald Trump complaining about Indian trade practices. Other issues such as India's trade ties with Iran and purchase of S-400 long-range air-defense missiles from Russia also have the potential to derail momentum. It is important to underline that some differences are not a direct consequence of the Indo-US relationship, but arise from the United States targeting a third country.
Washington's sanctions on Russia through CAATSA -Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Actwill have bearing on India's decision to import weapon systems. In terms of a defense-industrial setup, there exists path dependency as most Indian platforms are of Russian origin, given Cold War-era ties. Besides, New Delhi's distance from Moscow could lead to it to supply sophisticated defense systems to Pakistan with severe implications for regional stability. Similarly, flaring tensions with Iran and Venezuela put India's energy security at stake with India dependent on imports for more than 80 percent of its energy. New Delhi also remains concerned about the trajectory of US policy in Afghanistan, where Pakistan wields influence and India's substantive investment in building capacity might come to nothing as US engagement with the Taliban makes the extreme faction a central pillar of the Afghan politics. During the US visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in July 2019, Trump suggested that the Indian prime minister wanted the US president's mediation on the Kashmir issueresulting in a political backlash in New Delhi, with many questioning the intentions of the Trump administration toward India.
Though Modi has taken India considerably closer to the United Sates, he has managed to balance it with outreach to China and Russia. As Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar has noted, "We have many relationships … they have a history. We will do what is in our national interest and part of the strategic partnership is the ability of each country to comprehend and appreciate the national interest of others." 4 In this age of fluid global environment, all major powers are building partnerships with multiple actors, and New Delhi also wants to engage in "issue-based alignments." So to manage President Trump's disruptive approach toward the global economic order, India has sought to build its ties with China on the basis of their global convergence in managing the externalities emerging as a product of Trump's policies. Uncertainty in the global order is resulting in preference for fluid partnerships for major powers.
In a revealing statement, Jaishankar's candid take on American presence in the region was a testament to greater realism in Indian foreign policy. He had suggested that "from an Indian perspective today, for us the fact that the US is both a source of supply and a military partner helps to create enough uncertainties that could actually strengthen security in the Indo-Pacific region." 5 As the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific undergoes a dramatic shift, New Delhi's assessment of this balance will be key in preserving its equities in this flux.
The Modi government is redefining strategic autonomy as an objective that is attainable through strengthened partnerships rather than the avoidance of partnerships. By doing so, it seems to be underlining that in today's complicated global scene, strategic autonomy and non-alignment are not necessarily a package deal. When India engages in the so-called "Quad", it enhances its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China. When it sits together with Russia and China for a trilateral, it enhances its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis a Trump administration intent on challenging the fundamentals of the global economic order.
This special issue if India Review explores the rapidly evolving US-India-China strategic triangle from multiple perspectivestheoretical, historical and contemporary. In the first article T.V. Paul and Erik Underwood build on Robert Jervis' concept of strategic triangles. They argue that triangles are important in influencing state behavior in the areas of balance of power, deterrence, arms races and status competition, and analyze these interactions along multiple dimensions. Their article focuses on the US-India-China triangle in the context of growing economic interdependence and China's rise.
The next article by Tanvi Madan brings a historical lens to this question, focusing on the period 1949-1979. She argues that that American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China shaped the US-India relationship even during the Cold War, thereby exploring this triangle not only historically but also shedding light on the consequences of this historical trajectory on contemporary developments in this triangle.
I examine contemporary trends in this triangle from the perspective of New Delhi and argue that a combination of structural and domestic political variables has led to a significant shift from a soft balancing approach by China and India vis-à-vis the US to a more robust-limited hard balancing by India and the US vis-à-vis China. With the focus of global politics shifting to the Indo-Pacific and the maritime domain becoming the new theater of global power politics, the triangular relationship between India, the US, and China needs a fresh evaluation. This is followed by Joshua T. White's article which explores the reasons for the lack of academic work on how the US manages to navigate between China and India, two key poles of an emerging Indo-Pacific order. He suggests that the US bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia but unlike in the past, new challenges are likely to emerge which will force Washington to deal with the wider geography of the Indo-Pacific in a more interconnected manner.
Finally, Alexander Korolev and Fengshi Wuexamine China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, US-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. They argue that neither Chinese leaders nor the regime's official media outlets would speak of China-India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia-India-China triangle). Chinese core official media seems to have tried to minimize the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.
These articles take our understanding of a very critical strategic triangle forward as greater interconnectedness between these three powers is set to change the balance of power in the wider Indo-Pacific. As China and India continue their ascent in global inter-state hierarchy and the US re-evaluates its options in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific, it will be even more important to study interactions among these three major powers. This special issue, which emerged out a conference convened by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, is aimed at generating a more productive discussion on the causes and consequences of these major power interactions.
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